Students With Disabilities Score Class Action Victory In Second Circuit

Jenna Mowat, Summer Law Clerk, The Impact Fund

Earlier this month, the Second Circuit issued a great published decision in A.R. v. Conn. State Bd. of Educ., No. 20-2255, 2021 WL 2833031 (2d Cir. July 8, 2021) affirming a permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from terminating programs for students with disabilities who did not receive their high school diplomas before turning 22. The panel upheld the district court’s conclusion that a Connecticut law denying special education programs to students between their 21st and 22nd birthdays violated the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which requires free, appropriate education for students with disabilities.

In 2016, the mother of a student with disabilities brought a putative class action under the IDEA on behalf of her son D.J. and other students with disabilities who were receiving special education in Connecticut and who were, or were threatened, to be denied further special education opportunities after they turned 21 years old. A Connecticut law provided that while local and regional boards of education are required to provide special education to children who need it, that obligation ends when the student graduates from high school or turns 21 years old. The plaintiffs contended that this age restriction violated IDEA because it only applied to special education students while non-special education students could continue to receive public education after the age of 21. 

The Second Circuit upheld the District Court’s decision that the Board violated the rights of the class under IDEA by denying public education to students with disabilities between the ages of 21 and 22.

Last summer, the District of Connecticut (Haight, J.) certified the class as all individuals in Connecticut between the ages of 21 and 22 who received a specialized education under IDEA but had not received a regular high school diploma, and who, but for turning 21, would have otherwise qualified to continue their education until age 22. The class also included individuals who would turn 21 during the lawsuit.

Shortly after class certification, the district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The court held that the Board violated the rights of the class under IDEA by denying public education to students with disabilities between the ages of 21 and 22, but not to students in that same age range without disabilities. The court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from continuing this practice. The court also awarded class members compensatory education services to remedy any earlier deprivations in a child’s education, because some class members would not benefit from ordinary injunctive relief. In a separate opinion, the court held that D.J. had standing as a class representative because he had not yet received a high school diploma, even though he had enough credits to graduate.

At issue was the interpretation of “public education” within the meaning of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

The Board appealed, but the Second Circuit affirmed. First, the panel (Kearse, Cabranes, and Bianco, JJ.) ruled that D.J. had standing because D.J. received ten fewer months of special education than he would have if not for the Board’s enforcement of the Connecticut law. Next, the panel addressed the question of “public education” within the IDEA, which is not defined in the statute. Plaintiffs argued that denying adult public education to students with disabilities between the ages of 21 and 22 while providing it to individuals without disabilities in this age range violated the IDEA. Defendants countered that these adult education programs do not constitute “public education” within the meaning of IDEA because they differ from education provided in the state’s public schools. 

Applying traditional tools of statutory construction, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that “public education” under the IDEA should be defined as: (1) a public expense; (2) under the supervision of state agencies; and (3) with the objective of educating students to achieve secondary school academic proficiency. On appeal, the Board disputed the lower court definition, noting that Connecticut considers public education as “public school” education only, but the Second Circuit found no “actual definition” in the Connecticut Constitution, statutes, or regulations to support this point. Thus, the Second Circuit declined to tailor the definition of public education to Connecticut law. 

Congratulations to our colleagues at Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky and Disability Rights Connecticut for their win!